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Trustworthiness and Motivations
Natalie Gold
6.1 Introduction: The Principle of Self-Regard
In 1836, John Stewart Mill wrote of political economy, as it was then called, 
that it presupposes ‘an arbitrary definition of man, as a being who inevitably 
does that by which he may obtain the greatest amount of necessaries, con-
veniences, and luxuries, with the smallest quantity of labour and physical 
self-denial with which they can be obtained’ (Mill 1836: V.46). Despite the 
rise of behavioural economics, this is still the standard picture. As a widely 
used graduate textbook in microeconomic theory states: ‘A defining feature 
of microeconomic theory is that it aims to model economic activity as an 
interaction of individual economic agents pursuing their private interests’ 
(Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green 1995). Standard models assume not only 
that people are self-interested, in the sense of being concerned with their own 
well-being—they are also assumed to be selfish, in the sense of only being 
concerned with their own well-being, and even self-regarding, in that their 
well-being merely concerns themselves and does not reference any other 
agent—a kind of solipsism or ‘unsympathetic isolation’.1 Hence I will call 
this assumption about motivation the principle of self-regard.2 It is often traced 
back to Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, where he famously wrote, ‘It is not 
from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect 
our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, 
1 The term ‘unsympathetc isolation’ is due to Edgeworth (1881: 12).
2 This definition of self-regard follows from Mill’s definition of self-regarding conduct in 
On Liberty (I.9), as that which ‘merely concerns oneself’. Mill’s concern was with actions, and 
whether they would have any harmful effect on others, but his adjective could just as well be 
applied to people’s interests.
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not to their humanity, but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our 
own necessities, but of their advantages’ (Smith 1776: ch. 2).
The principle of self regard became increasingly important in the late nine-
teenth century, with the work of economists such as Alfred Marshall and 
Francis Edgeworth, whose analyses emphasised the way in which the interac-
tion of individual agents causes economic outcomes. They pioneered a math-
ematical model of behaviour in which individuals maximise utility and firms 
maximise profits, subject to constraints on their budgets and resources. This 
is the core of neoclassical economics, which is in the current mainstream of 
the subject.3 In terms of the underlying mathematics, ‘utility’ is an empty 
placeholder which includes anything that might make an agent choose one 
option over another. In other words, the theory of behaviour that the model 
represents is one where individuals pursue their interests, where ‘interests’ 
can be understood in the loosest possible sense of the term, as anything that 
a person would like to achieve.4 However, in practice, the content of ‘util-
ity’ needs to be specified if models are to have any predictive or descriptive 
power—which is equivalent to delimiting a person’s interests. When inter-
preting and applying economic models, utility is usually taken to be a func-
tion of the agent’s own consumption of goods and services, and agents to be 
self-regarding. Agents are, as Edgeworth put it, in a state of ‘unsympathetic 
isolation’ (Edgeworth 1881: 12).
The principle of self-regard was not supposed to be taken as a theory of 
human nature. Although it is often attributed to Adam Smith, he most cer-
tainly did not endorse it. Despite the above, often quoted, passage from the 
Wealth of Nations, Smith opened his earlier Theory of Moral Sentiments with a 
contradictory empirical claim, ‘Howsoever man may be supposed, there are 
evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune 
3 Specifically, it is the mainstream way of modelling individuals and firms. But not all main-
stream economics papers model individuals or firms.
4 The ‘utility’ terminology can cause confusion because of its etymology. It was introduced into 
economics alongside formal methods, in the so-called ‘marginalist revolution’, which showed 
how prices depend on the value of the last (or marginal) unit consumed or produced. In the 
influential work of William Jevons, marginalism was associated with a theory of value that was 
based on Bethamite utilitarianism and the idea that there is a monistic and measurable pleas-
ure–pain index: hence ‘marginal utility’ (Jevons 1871). However, as Bentham’s theory fell out of 
favour, economists also distanced themselves from it, culminating in the ‘ordinal revolution’ of 
the 1930s, when economists rejected the idea that there was a cardinal scale of utility. Utility func-
tions were still used but they only represented an ordinal valuation, i.e. consumers were assumed 
to be able to rank commodity bundles but not to be able to quantify these judgements. The fact 
that these ordinal preferences could be represented with a mathematical function meant that, in 
the formalism of the model, consumers are represented as ‘maximising utility’. However, despite 
the continued use of the word ‘utility’, economics had been decoupled from utilitarianism: the 
primitive concept was that of a preference ranking, and no assumptions were made about what 
considerations underpinned the ranking. To maximise utility is just to choose the most preferred 
consumption bundle from those available.
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of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives 
nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it’ (Smith 1759). For Smith, 
humans are fundamentally social beings and have other-regarding motiva-
tions. Furthermore, The Wealth of Nations builds on the discussion that was 
in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, where it is made clear that self-interest is 
set within the wider context of social obligations and that it is associated 
with the classical virtue of prudence, not the vice of greed (Smith 2013). It 
has become commonplace to take passages from The Wealth of Nations out of 
context and to forget that Smith’s writings pre-date the neoclassical idea of 
individuals as utility maximisers.
Even the fathers of neoclassical economics merely took the principle of 
self-regard to be a good approximation of motivation in certain domains. 
Mill acknowledged that conduct could depend on ‘the feelings called forth 
in a human being by other individual human or intelligent beings, as such; 
namely, the affections, the conscience, or feeling of duty, and the love of appro-
bation’ (Mill 1836: V.34, italics in the original). However, he considered these 
motivations to be the subject matter of philosophy. Edgeworth thought that 
people care about the welfare of others, even indicating how concern for oth-
ers could be incorporated into his mathematical framework, but he believed 
that the principle of self-regard was a reasonable assumption in both war and 
trade (Collard 2001).
The original neoclassical economists were also reticent about the domain 
of economic theory. Early formulations of the theory required cardinal 
measurement of utility and it was more plausible that people could make 
the required numerical comparisons if they only had to compare material 
satisfactions. However, once the original cardinal foundations (and the asso-
ciation with utilitarianism) were rejected in favour of the modern ordinal 
ones, which only require a ranking of outcomes, that paved the way for the 
utility-maximising model to become an all-encompassing theory of human 
behaviour (Lewin 1996; Mandler 2001). But, if the ordinal framework is aug-
mented with the principle of self-regard, then the expansion of the economic 
approach looks more dubious.
In the policy domain, the popularity of the principle of self-regard may 
owe something to Smith’s idea that a person who intends only his own gain 
is led by an ‘invisible hand’ to pursue the good of society, ‘more effectually 
than when he really intends to promote it’ (Smith 1776: ch. 2). Not only has 
the principle of self-regard seemed like a reasonable assumption but, if people 
would act according to it, then it would promote good outcomes. However, 
the principle of self-regard narrows the range of tools that are available for 
policymakers. A  consequence of using Mills’ ‘arbitrary definition’ is that 
interventions are limited to financial incentive schemes, or regulations that 
are enforced by the threat of fines or prison. One argument of this chapter 
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is that excessive focus on the principle of self-regard obscures other—poten-
tially very effective—policy interventions.
Even within the domain of political economy, both Marshall and Mill 
explicitly recognised that the principle of self-regard was a simplification. 
Marshall thought that the focus on self-regard was justified because ‘the 
steadiest motive to ordinary business work is the desire for the pay which is 
the material reward of work’ (Marshall 1890: Book 1, ch. 2, V1). However, he 
immediately followed this with the statement that, ‘Everyone who is worth 
anything carries his higher nature with him into business’. Similarly, Mill 
conceded that the principle of self-regard was a simplification, ‘treating the 
main and acknowledged end [of behaviour] as if it were the sole end’ (Mill 
1934: V.38). This led Mill to conclude that the resulting ‘approximation’ of 
behaviour might need to be corrected to take account of other impulses (Mill 
1934: V.34). To the extent that we are influenced by other motives, models 
based on the principle of self-regard will fail to explain or predict events, and 
policies based on the principle of self-regard will not have the desired effects.
In this chapter, I will argue that we need to move beyond self-regard when 
we formulate regulations for finance. Self-regard is not a good assumption and 
behaviour that is based on it will not produce good outcomes. That is because 
the principle of self-regard precludes an important sort of trust and trust-
worthiness, which is based on non-self-regarding motivations, and which 
we rely on in finance. This implies that, when formulating policy, we should 
consider how to design institutions and regulations so that they induce the 
relevant non-self-regarding motivations, and that we should design financial 
institutions so that they attract employees who are more likely to have those 
motivations.
6.2 Beyond Self-Regard: A Richer Account of Motivations
In economics, it is standard to assume that an agent is only motivated by her 
own material rewards and punishments, and to investigate the optimal way 
to structure incentives given these self-regarding motivations. There are two 
cross-cutting objections to this project: that people are not only motivated 
by their own rewards, and that people are not only motivated by their material 
rewards. My focus is on the first of these objections, but before I explore some 
of the ways in which people may be non-self-regarding, it is worth explaining 
how the two objections relate to each other.
When a person acts in order to get an ‘apparent reward’ (or avoid a punish-
ment), psychologists say that she has an extrinsic motivation (Deci 1975). This 
is in contrast to intrinsic motivation, which does not involve apparent external 
rewards. Examples of intrinsic motivation include completing a task because 
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it is fun or because one is obliged, as opposed to doing a task because one will 
be paid or punished depending on completion. We might think of extrinsi-
cally motivated behaviour as that which aims to get an external reward, sup-
plied by some other agent.
The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations divides up 
behaviour differently from that between self-regarding and non-self-regarding 
behaviour. For instance, Marshall acknowledged that, in the economic 
domain, as well as being motivated by the desire for pay some people are 
motivated by a desire for approbation or by the pleasure of doing skilful work 
(Marshall 1890). The pleasure of doing skilful work is clearly an intrinsic 
motivation, but it is also a self-regarding one. The desire for approbation is 
arguably an extrinsic motivation, but it is certainly other-regarding, as it chal-
lenges the assumption of unsympathetic isolation.
My concern is with the self-regard of neoclassical agents: their goals never 
depend on other people, and their behaviour is always about the achievement 
of those goals, never about how they act in the pursuit. Hence neoclassical 
economics neglects some of the goals that we pursue which, whilst selfish, 
essentially depend on other people. It also entirely disregards two important 
classes of motivation, pro-social and procedural, where the goals pursued are 
not the narrow (selfish) self-interest of the agent.5
6.2.1 Pro-Social Motivations
People are not only concerned with their own outcomes. They may be con-
cerned with the outcomes of others. (In the economic model: agents’ utility 
may be a function of others’ outcomes as well as their own.) The desire to 
improve the outcome of others is a pro-social motivation; its opposite, which 
is rarely studied, could be considered an antisocial motivation, the desire 
to diminish the outcomes of others.6 These are types of other-regarding 
motivations.
Pro-social motivation covers a variety of ways in which we may be con-
cerned about the outcomes of others. The one that has attracted most atten-
tion from researchers is altruism, the concern for the outcomes of another 
or others (e.g. Collard 1978; Fehr and Fischbacher 2003). Another pro-social 
motivation that is increasingly attracting attention is the concern for the 
5 Note that my concern is with proximate goals. People may get a ‘warm glow’ from 
non-self-regarding behaviours, so that pursing such goals is still, in a sense, self-interested or 
welfare-enhancing. I do not have a stake in the debate about whether such self-interest is always 
the ultimate goal of action. For more on that debate, especially arguments and evidence that help-
ing behaviours are not always the result of an ultimately self-interested motivation, see Sober and 
Wilson (1998), Batson and Shaw (1991), and Batson (2011).
6 For some exceptions, see Zizzo and Oswald (2001) and Abbink and Sadrieh (2009).
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outcome of one’s group (e.g. Bacharach 2006; Sugden 1993). This differs from 
altruism because it stems from a common category membership and is a con-
cern for the collective outcome of ‘our’ or ‘my’ group, whereas altruism is 
the interpersonal promotion of ‘your’ or ‘their’ welfare (Brewer and Gardner 
1996). The outcome of the group need not necessarily reduce to the outcomes 
of the individual members, nor must improvements in the group outcome 
reflect improvements in the outcomes of individual members, although we 
might think that it is likely to do so, or that it will do so in a well-functioning 
group (Gold 2012). Experimental manipulations that increase group identity 
lead to more pro-social behaviour (e.g. Brewer and Kramer 1986). It is diffi-
cult to disentangle whether this is caused by concern for the outcome of the 
group or by altruism because, particularly in small groups, increasing group 
identity may also increase interpersonal altruism between members of the 
group. However, it is important to distinguish the two concerns conceptu-
ally because they may lead to different outcomes (Bacharach 1999; Gold and 
Sugden 2007).
6.2.2 Procedure-Regarding Motivations
People are not only concerned with their own outcomes. The aims of human 
behaviour are not always focused on end states. For example, people may 
want to behave fairly, to behave morally, to follow norms, or to abide by 
standards (e.g. professionalism, doing a good job according to standards in 
one’s field). They are not so much interested in the outcome per se as in the 
way in which it is achieved or the principle on which they act. These motiva-
tions are procedure-regarding.
It may be possible to interpret some cases of procedure-regard as the achieve-
ment of outcomes or end states (for instance, we might think of fairness as 
being about achieving equal outcomes, or morality—on consequentialist 
views—as being about implementing the best outcomes), or to fit them into a 
modelling framework of means–end reasoning.7 However, even if that is pos-
sible, it will get the order of explanation wrong. Sometimes people desire to 
follow a procedure, often a normative rule, for its own sake, not as a means to 
an end; the ensuing outcome is secondary to the choice of procedure.
6.2.3 Selfish Yet Other-Regarding Motivations
Even allowing that agents are completely selfish and concerned with their 
own outcomes, these outcomes may reference other people. For instance, 
7 For the possibilities and limits of this modelling approach, see, e.g., Broome (1992) and Brown 
(2011).
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agents may care about being esteemed by others, and pursuit of esteem may 
motivate their behaviour (Brennan and Pettit 2004; Offer 1997 and Chapter 7 
in this book). Here we have a sense in which agents may be other-regarding 
despite being completely selfish:  they are concerned with the opinions of 
others.
We can use esteem and regard to incentivise behaviour; they increase our 
repertoire of extrinsic rewards. Even if undertaken for purely selfish reasons, 
the pursuit of esteem and regard may indirectly lead people to care about the 
outcomes of others—because how others perceive your intentions and your 
contributions to their outcomes will affect the attitudes they hold towards 
you.8 In George Eliot’s Mill on the Floss (Book 1, ch. 6), Tom and Maggie 
Tulliver split a jam puff. Tom does his best to divide it equally but fails, and 
Maggie urges Tom to take the best bit. However, Eliot remarks ‘I fear she cared 
less that Tom should enjoy the utmost possible amount of puff, than that 
he should be pleased with her for giving him the best bit’, establishing that 
Maggie is not an unselfish character, despite her other-regarding behaviour.
We are not purely self-regarding creatures. As well as copious experimen-
tal evidence, we know this from introspection and by observing everyday 
life. Furthermore, as I will go on to argue, non-self-regarding motivations are 
essential to a proper understanding of trustworthy behaviour.
6.3 Trust, Trustworthiness, and Motivations
Trusting is a risky business. A truster makes herself vulnerable to her trustee, 
exposing herself to the risk that her trust will not be fulfilled. We can think 
of trust as a three-place relation: A trusts B to X. A is the truster, B the trustee, 
and X is an undertaking with an outcome that A cares about. A person (or 
institution) who fulfils the trust that is placed in them is trustworthy.
In economics, this minimal definition is taken as sufficient: trust and trust-
worthiness are defined as behaviours (see, e.g., Fehr 2009) and the neoclas-
sical way of studying trust is to ask to how trustworthy behaviour can be 
sustained, based on self-regarding motivations. According to this approach, 
trustworthiness can be ensured by threatening punishments and offering 
rewards, structuring the trustee’s incentives so that it is in her self-regarding 
interest to be trustworthy. One type of reward is the expected benefit from 
future encounters, so if the truster and the trustee have a continuing relation-
ship, then there is an incentive for a self-regarding agent to be trustworthy 
(Hardin 1996, 2004).
8 See Rabin (1993) for a classic economic model that includes intentions, and Falk, Fehr, and 
Fischbacher (2008) for recent evidence that intentions matter.
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However, the idea that trustworthiness is based on self-regard is empirically 
and theoretically inadequate. Empirically, there is plenty of evidence that 
people behave in a trustworthy manner, even when that leaves them worse 
off. (See the discussion of the ‘trust game’ below.) Theoretically, most phi-
losophers reject the neoclassical analysis of trust. Philosophical analyses also 
use the behavioural definition of trust but they take it as a starting point: a 
necessary condition that must be further augmented because, as it stands, the 
neoclassical analysis conflates trustworthiness with reliability.
The concern to distinguish trustworthiness from reliability stems partly 
from the fact that, unlike reliability, trustworthiness is often considered to be 
a moral virtue. Reliability is a property that may be possessed by mechanical 
objects. For example, we may rely on our alarm clock to wake us up in the 
morning, but we do not trust it. However, reliability is not just a property of 
mechanical objects—it can also apply to human agents performing inten-
tional actions. For instance, the philosopher Kant was in the habit of taking 
a walk at 3.30 pm every day, and he was so punctual that his neighbours 
could set their clocks by him. Imagine a neighbour who used Kant’s walk to 
time the school run, almost as though he were an alarm clock. She would 
have been relying on him in order that her children would not be left wait-
ing by the school gates, but it would be wrong to say that she trusted him. 
Furthermore, if Kant had been late for his walk, causing her to be late for the 
children, then he would not have been culpable. But someone who breaches 
a trust is prima facie culpable. This difference between reliability and trust-
worthiness is reflected in the moral psychology of trust. When someone we 
trust lets us down, we feel betrayed; but disappointment is the appropriate 
attitude to being let down by someone or something we rely on. There is a 
normative element to trust, which is not present in reliance.
It is tempting—but wrong—to conclude from the above examples that 
the difference between trustworthiness and reliability relates to ‘intending 
to X’. After all, a car does not intend to start and, although Kant did some-
thing intentionally, what he intended was to ‘take a walk at 3.30 pm’ and not 
‘ensure that his neighbour be on time for the school run’. The neighbour is 
simply relying on Kant’s predictable punctuality, in much the same way that 
she would depend on a predictable alarm clock. So it seems that ‘intending 
to X’ is necessary for trustworthiness. However, in most of the philosophical 
literature it is not sufficient that the trustee intends to X, she must also do X 
for the right sort of reason.
There is widespread agreement amongst philosophers that behaviour that 
is motivated by the pursuit of rewards or the avoidance of punishment is 
reliable rather than trustworthy. As Annette Baier puts it, ‘We may rely on 
our fellows’ fear of the newly appointed security guards in shops to deter 
them from injecting poison into the food on the shelves, once we have ceased 
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to trust them’ (Baier 1986: 234, my italics). This stipulation relates to issues of 
moral psychology and culpability. If we use an incentive system to motivate 
someone and it fails to work, then the fault lies with our design of the system 
and we should feel disappointed, not betrayed. Hence the general agreement 
that trustworthy behaviour must be sufficiently ‘internally driven’ (Holton 
1994: 66).
Philosophers disagree about what the intrinsic motivation involved in 
trustworthiness must be. A popular account is given by Annette Baier (1986), 
who argues that trustworthy behaviour is motivated by ‘good will’, a motiva-
tion to take care of something the trustee cares about. Baier identifies trust-
worthy behaviour as driven by a concern for the truster’s outcomes, i.e. it is 
a type of pro-social behaviour. Karen Jones (1996) argues that goodwill is not 
enough and that, in addition (in order to exclude cases where someone is 
reliably benevolent), the trustworthy person must be directly and favourably 
moved by the fact that someone is counting on her.
In contrast, a compelling recent account of trust, due to Katharine Hawley 
(2012), locates the difference between trust and reliance in terms of ‘com-
mitments’.9 According to Hawley, trusting someone is a matter of relying 
on them to meet their commitments, and trustworthiness is a matter of 
adjusting one’s behaviour to one’s commitments. Hence the virtue involved 
in trustworthiness is that of living up to one’s commitments. It is obvious 
that we can acquire commitments through explicit promises and contracts, 
but commitments may also arise without an explicit agreement—for exam-
ple, through accepting a role or via social conventions. Hawley says that to 
ascribe trustworthiness in some specific instance, it is enough for the trustee 
to behave in accordance with her commitment. She need not be motivated 
by the commitment. However, when we talk of the virtue of trustworthiness, 
we indicate a general trustworthiness, someone who will fulfil whatever com-
mitments they have. So we might expect that ‘a generally trustworthy person 
will often meet her commitments simply because they are her commitments’ 
(Hawley 2012: 16). We can classify this as a procedure-regarding motivation, 
for fulfilling commitments.
Unlike the self-regarding account of trust used in economics, most phi-
losophers favour an account that involves non-self-regarding motivations. 
9 Note that this is a different usage from the one that is most commonly used in economics. 
In philosophy, ‘commitment’ is a normative term and, for Hawley, it is supposed to connote 
something similar to an obligation (although commitments and obligations are different and she 
argues that it is commitment, and not obligation, that is important for trustworthiness). This nor-
mative usage differs from the use of ‘commitment’ which is often found in economics, whereby 
‘commitment’ is a descriptive term connoting a form of binding, in contrast to ‘discretion’ or 
‘flexibility’. It also differs from the well-known use of the word by Amartya Sen (1977), where 
‘commitment’ is an attitude that transcends self-interest and may result in a choice that does not 
maximise the agent’s welfare.
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However, there is disagreement about how best to formulate a motivational 
account of trustworthiness—whether it involves a species of pro-social moti-
vation or whether the motivation is ultimately procedure-regarding. As a 
philosophical theory, I  favour the procedural account. But much of what 
I will go on to argue is compatible with either account because the fiduci-
ary duties that exist in finance involve the commitment to promote the cli-
ent’s interests. What the goodwill and the commitment accounts have in 
common is that trustworthy (as opposed to reliable) behaviour stems from 
non-self-regarding and non-selfish motivations.
6.4 Strong Trust
The behavioural definition of trustworthiness used in economics will label 
some actions as ‘trustworthy’ that an account of trustworthiness that also 
stipulates motivations would label ‘reliable’. Rather than get into a discipli-
nary dispute about terminology, we can grant a behavioural use of the word 
trust (and trustworthiness) but distinguish between ‘strong trust’ and ‘weak 
trust’ (and strong and weak trustworthiness), where strong trustworthiness 
must include a non-self-regarding motivation on the part of the trustee, but 
weak trustworthiness can be the result of any motivation. Hence, weak trust 
will include cases that some philosophers would claim are only instances of 
reliance and are not ‘really’ trust.
Even my definition of strong trust will fail to satisfy most philosophers 
because it incorporates all non-self-regarding motivations (including selfish 
but other-regarding motives, such as the pursuit of esteem). I do not need 
to be invested in the dispute about which non-self-regarding motivation is 
the ‘correct’ one because I am concerned with the psychology of trustwor-
thy behaviour and the motivations that are its wellspring, not the sources of 
its normativity. So, for instance, the fact that people have a ‘sense of moral 
duty’ is relevant, but whether people really have such duties or whether their 
moral psychology reliably tracks them are of no import to my argument. My 
argument for using strong trust is consequentialist, that it gets good results. 
I am sure that sometimes we have a moral duty to be trustworthy. But the 
foundation of morality is a thorny issue; philosophers don’t even agree about 
why trustworthiness is a virtue. So it is a good thing that we can construct 
an argument for strong trust in finance without straying into the terrain of 
moral duties.
We need strong trust. It is more efficient than weak, and we rely on it in 
most everyday transactions. It has a priority over weak trust, as I will explain 
below. I will also argue that, in at least some financial transactions, strong 
trust is important because weak trust may not be a possibility.
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6.4.1 The Existence of Strong Trustworthiness
We can be sure that strong trustworthiness exists: experimental econom-
ics gives us the evidence. The ‘trust game’ has two players, a ‘sender’ and a 
‘receiver’. The sender is endowed with $10. She may choose to transfer some 
or all of it to the receiver. Any money that is transferred is multiplied up by 
the experimenter. Then the receiver gets to choose whether to send any of 
that money back. By sending money, the sender opens up the possibility of 
mutual gain because the experimenter increases the pot of money. But, by 
sending, she also exposes herself to risk because there is no guarantee that 
the receiver will send any of that money back. If the sender sends money 
and her trust is not fulfilled, then she is worse off than if she had sent 
nothing.
If both agents in a trust game are rational and self-regarding, then the 
receiver will never transfer any money back, the sender can predict that there 
would be no back-transfer if she sent money, and hence she sends none. The 
sender correctly anticipates that any trust would be breached, so she never 
places any trust.
However, people trust and are trustworthy. In the original trust experiment 
conducted by Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995), virtually all senders sent 
at least some money, the average amount sent was over $5, and roughly one 
third of the receivers reciprocated by sending back more than was originally 
sent. The game was only played once, so there was no tangible benefit of 
sending back money. Therefore those who reciprocated were strongly trust-
worthy. This is even more noteworthy because the experiment was ‘double 
blind’, i.e. participants were anonymous to the experimenters as well as to 
each other.
6.4.2 The Efficiency of Strong Trust
Strong trust is both more demanding than weak trust and more stable: it is 
robust to a wider range of counterfactual situations. Trustworthy behaviour 
that is only compelled by a desire to avoid punishment will no longer be 
trustworthy in the absence of that punishment. Robustness is an important 
property. For example, imagine two parties trying to broker an agreement for 
mutual benefit. If they can only rely on each other’s weak trustworthiness, 
then they need to construct a contract containing clauses to cover every pos-
sible eventuality. If they are motivated by strong trust, then an incomplete 
contract may suffice. Since most contracts are by necessity incomplete, in the 
absence of strong trust contractors would often have to fall back on costly 
legal processes. It is clear from this that where strong trust is available, it is 
more efficient than weak.
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6.4.3 The Priority of Strong Trust
Strong trust is ubiquitous. It is involved in virtually all market transactions. 
When we hand over our money to the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, we 
expect that they will hand over the goods in exchange. According to the prin-
ciple of self-regard, this behaviour must be motivated by reputation—if it is 
known that a tradesman does not hand over the goods then people will not 
trade with him in the future—or by the threat of recourse to legal action. But 
this is not what really motivates people to complete transactions. When we 
hand over our money to the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, we trust that 
they will hand over the goods in exchange, and that is based on the expecta-
tion of strong trustworthiness.
In case you are in doubt about this, consider another example—that of tak-
ing a taxi. Payments for services always have an element of asymmetry, with 
the payment point being either before or after the service (and the situation 
where payment is split between these two points in time is relatively rare). 
The party who performs their part of the bargain first must trust the other 
party to complete. When hailing a cab on the street, it is normal to pay for 
the ride after being dropped off at one’s destination and it is unlikely that the 
rider will ever be picked up by the same taxi driver again, or could be identi-
fied and excluded by the community of taxi drivers. But it is extremely rare 
for the rider to run off at the end without paying.10 I have never even consid-
ered doing that; nor, I suspect, have most people.
This brings us to the relation between trust and laws, and the priority 
of strong trust. When we receive goods and services, a legal framework for 
enforcement of payment does exist and, in extremis, we could have recourse 
to the law. But the neoclassical idea that we need the law in order to trust (in 
a weak sense) gets things the wrong way round. Effective laws codify behav-
ioural standards that (most) people are already motivated to live up to and, 
when there is widespread disagreement with the standard, then the law is 
not enforced—think of laws against cannabis, homosexual intercourse, and 
tax evasion in some Mediterranean countries. A consequence of this is that 
legal changes alone, without corresponding changes in social norms, have 
limited efficacy as a mechanism for behaviour change, as has been found by 
those who seek to eradicate female genital cutting (Mackie ms). Only when 
the majority of people are already prepared to comply with the law can the 
authorities enforce it on a minority of deviants. In other words, it is only 
10 One might argue that, across the whole population, it is better if riders pay as otherwise no 
one would become a taxi driver. But it would still be in any individual rider’s financial interests 
not to pay: we have an n-person prisoner’s dilemma, and a purely self-regarding person would 
never pay for taxi rides.
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because the majority of people are trustworthy in a strong sense that the law 
can be used to ensure that everybody is trustworthy in the weak sense.
6.5 Strong Trust in Finance
Strong trust is a feature of all transactions, but it is particularly important 
in finance. Financial products are often very complicated, there is a whole 
chain of transactions between the initial seller and the end user, and the end 
user typically is not in a good position to assess the product. There is asym-
metric information, where the seller knows important facts about the product 
that are unknown to the buyer. Asymmetric information is not unique to 
finance, and it has been much studied by economists. The standard example 
of asymmetric information is the market for lemons, a model of the used-car 
market (Akerlof 1970). The amount that a buyer is willing to pay depends on 
the quality of the car she is being offered, but she does not know whether the 
car is good quality or whether it is a ‘lemon’. If she buys a car then she bears 
a risk of overpayment—which may mean she does not buy. In the used-car 
market, it is possible to overcome asymmetries of information without trust. 
Sellers can ameliorate the risk (and get what their car is worth) by offering 
devices such as warranties. Even with asymmetric information, caveat emp-
tor or ‘buyer beware’ is the norm. But the situation in finance is not a simple 
market for lemons. We can identify at least two differences.
The first difference relates to the types of product that are for sale. In the 
market for lemons there are high-quality cars and low-quality lemons; the 
low-quality lemons are still cars that someone would want to buy, at the 
right price, and the risk is that of overpaying. But there is a third type of car, 
which does not enter the marketplace. We can distinguish a lemon from a 
death trap, a car that has a potentially fatal fault, which is known to the seller. 
Death traps are not a feature of the used-car market; they go on the scrap mar-
ket instead. But in the run-up to the crash, the financial equivalent of death 
traps were sold, products that were not fit for purpose—for example, vehicles 
for retirement savings that were expected to be completely wiped out in thir-
teen years (as discussed by Peyton Young and Noe in this volume).
The market for lemons is a simplified depiction of the used-car market, 
and neither the model nor the market itself is characterised by the existence 
of death traps. This may be partly due to the long arm of the law, the exist-
ence of warranties, and the fact that (in the UK) buyers are savvy enough 
to insist on seeing a recent MOT certificate. But, importantly, most people 
would agree that it is simply wrong to sell a car that is a death trap to an 
unknowing or unwitting buyer. It would not even cross their minds to try 
to sell their death trap as a working car. We can trust people not to sell cars 
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that are death traps, in the strong as well as the weak sense. But, before 
the financial crisis, some bankers knowingly sold the financial equivalent of 
death traps. There was not even the basic level of trust that is assumed in the 
market for lemons model.
A second difference between finance and the market for lemons is the 
modes of product assessment that are available. The market for lemons is 
really a story about matching products to buyers, ensuring that buyers have 
enough information to make a relatively precise valuation of the product. 
A warranty is a signal of a high-quality product, which is worth paying more 
money for. But warranties do not exist in finance. There are no guarantees; 
products come with a health warning stating that they can go down as well as 
up. Potential buyers need reliable information about risk and returns in order 
to purchase appropriate products.
An alternative device for getting product information is third-party assess-
ment. This sometimes operates in the used-car market. When people buy 
and sell cars through personal ads there is unlikely to be a warranty, nor 
are most buyers competent to assess a car themselves. They may engage the 
services of a mechanic, a third party with the expertise to assess the car. In 
the ‘assessor model’ the burden of trustworthiness is shifted to the assessor 
and the relationship between buyer and seller is governed by caveat emp-
tor. Another example of this model is the housing market. A potential buyer 
pays third parties, in the UK a surveyor and a solicitor, to get all the relevant 
information. Estate agents, who represent the seller, are generally considered 
untrustworthy.
We can distinguish assessment from advice. Mechanics and surveyors give 
information about the quality, possibly including a valuation, but they don’t 
generally give advice about whether the car or house will meet the buyer’s 
needs, and whether or not to purchase it. In contrast, we sometimes expect 
not only information but also advice. In medicine, patients rely on the advice 
of doctors to make an informed choice between treatments. Sometimes, the 
doctor makes the choice for the patient—for instance, choosing which of a 
number of possible drugs to prescribe. In the legal profession, we may expect 
our lawyer both to represent us and to advise us on the best course of action. 
The relationship between advisor and advisee involves strong trust. An advi-
sor is supposed to take the advisee’s interests into account, providing advice 
about how best to further them. Professions that operate on the advisor model 
often have a professional ethic, an idea of the standards of good service and a 
commitment to uphold those standards.
However, advice and assessment are not completely distinct. Assessors do 
not necessarily advise, but advisors must to be able to make an assessment in 
order to give good advice.
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The existence of competent third-party assessors allows the relationship 
between buyer and seller to remain caveat emptor. But third-party assessment 
failed in the run-up to the financial crisis. External ratings agencies com-
pletely underestimated the risk of some products. There are a variety of rea-
sons for this failure, but it seems that at least some financial products are not 
amenable to third-party assessment. They are so complicated that only those 
who construct them (or not even those who construct them!) are in a posi-
tion to know all their implications.
The situation in finance may involve ‘asymmetric expertise’. The market 
for lemons model concentrates on asymmetric information, knowing ‘that’ a 
product is a lemon. In order to know that a product is a lemon (if there is no 
way of signalling it) we require the existence of an expert, who knows ‘how’ 
to assess the product.11 If a product is so complicated that only the seller is 
in a position to provide a reliable assessment, then there is an asymmetry of 
expertise between the seller and everyone else, an asymmetry of knowing 
‘how’ to make an assessment. On that case, only the seller is in a position to 
know relevant information about the product, so we need sellers to be trust-
worthy providers of information. (This may involve not just giving truthful 
information, but also revealing all relevant information to a buyer who does 
not know what information she should ask for.)
Finance is not simply a market for lemons. In the run-up to the crisis some 
people in the sector lacked even the basic level of trustworthiness assumed by 
the lemons model; and yet strong trust is particularly important in finance 
because there may be asymmetric expertise as well as asymmetric informa-
tion. Of course, one response to these problems is simply to regulate finan-
cial products—to ban death traps and to prevent products from becoming 
too complicated for third-party assessment—in order to ensure that sell-
ers are weakly trustworthy. However, regulation is only a partial solution. 
Regulations can be gamed and, whilst we can easily agree that some products 
are not fit for purpose, such as the savings vehicles discussed above, it will 
not always be so easy to distinguish what counts as a financial death trap as 
opposed to simply a very risky product that some informed consumer might 
buy; or to decide the trade-off between allowing the sale of a product that 
most people consider an unacceptable risk, even though the odd risk-seeker 
might choose to invest. Too much emphasis on regulation obscures a sec-
ond way we can prevent untrustworthy behaviour, namely to increase strong 
trustworthiness.
11 For more on the relation between knowing that and knowing how, see Stanley (2011).
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6.6 Preventing Untrustworthy Behaviour
In order to design effective policies to prevent untrustworthy behaviour, we 
need to understand the causes of that behaviour.12 The most salient cause of 
untrustworthy behaviour is the deliberate breaching of trust, where someone 
who knows that a trust has been placed in her purposefully breaches that 
trust for her own private gain. But that is not the only or maybe even the 
most prevalent cause of breaches of trust. We cannot always assume that eve-
ryone—the truster, the trustee, and any theorist or third-party observer to the 
transaction—frames the situation the same way. If we recognise the role of 
‘framing’ in decision making, then we can identify a second cause of breach 
of trust: when the truster and trustee frame the situation differently.
In our everyday lives, we negotiate many different relationships—our roles 
may include family member, friend, neighbour, worker, employer, client, 
consumer etc.—which are governed by different norms. These most obvi-
ously include norms of conduct, or behavioural norms, but there may also be 
norms about what emotions or motivations are appropriate, even if emotions 
and motivations are not something that we can always control. For instance, 
in market exchanges the range of motivations is not much restricted and 
there is licensed self-regard; at home the balance is tilted much more towards 
other-regarding-ness; and at work we may be committed to a professional 
ethic. It may be possible to abide by the behavioural norm without the 
expected motivation and emotion, but the lack of appropriate motivation 
and emotion is often seen as problematic (imagine parents who do not love 
their children, or doctors who are not motivated by the well-being of their 
patients, even if they perform all the behaviours that we expect from people 
occupying those roles).
A prerequisite for deciding to abide by the norms of a particular relation-
ship is seeing that they apply. Hence the considerations that motivate a 
person depend on the relationship that she takes herself to be in, how she 
‘frames’ her situation, and hence the norms that govern her interactions. 
A person can fail to be trustworthy because she does not frame an interaction 
as one that requires strong trust, even though she would have been moti-
vated to be trustworthy had she framed it differently. This contrasts with the 
12 What we should do to encourage trustworthy behaviour also depends on the motivation that 
underpins strongly trustworthy behaviour. For example, imagine a charity wanting to increase 
donations. If potential donors are motivated by esteem then the charity should offer to acknowl-
edge the donations publicly; if donors are motivated by sympathy then the charity should make 
salient the plight of those who will be helped by the donation; and if donors are motivated by 
commitment then the charity should remind potential donors of the relevant normative imper-
ative. But we can still come to some general conclusions and recommendations, even in the 
absence of a complete and accurate picture of what motivates human behaviour.
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paradigm of untrustworthy behaviour, which involves the recognition that a 
trust has been placed followed by a deliberate breach of that trust. As applied 
to finance, imagine a transaction where the buyer of a product believes the 
buyer–seller relationship operates on an advisor model, so she expects strong 
trustworthiness on the part of the seller. Contrast the situation where the 
seller knows how the buyer frames the transaction and sells her an unsuitable 
product anyway, in order to make a profit from a client, with the situation 
where the seller believes that the pair are merely buyer and seller, in a caveat 
emptor relationship, so it is the buyer’s job to get her own assessment of the 
product.
It does not matter to the neoclassical agent how anyone frames a trans-
action because the principle of self-regard dictates that agents will always 
pursue their private advantage. However, most people are not ‘knaves’, to use 
Hume’s term for people who are only ever motivated by their private interests 
(Hume 1741). Nowadays, psychologists use ‘psychopath’ as a label for people 
who lack empathy and conscience, and measure these tendencies on a ‘psy-
chopathy scale’ (Hare and Vertommen 2003; Levenson, Kiehl, and Fitzpatrick 
1995). The idea is that psychopathy is a personality trait, which people may 
have to varying degrees, and ‘psychopaths’ are people with pathologically 
high levels of the trait.13 Only 1% of the population are psychopaths. The vast 
majority of people are capable of non-self-regarding motivations.
Non-psychopaths are trust-responsive, tending to fulfil trust when they 
believe that it has been placed in them (Bacharach, Guerra, and Zizzo 2007). 
The trust game probably underestimates people’s capacity for trustworthi-
ness because the laboratory is an artificial situation with no cues from real 
life and what constitutes appropriate behaviour is ambiguous. Researchers 
phrase their instructions in ‘neutral’ terms and normatively laden labels are 
avoided. For example, subjects are referred to as ‘actors’ or ‘participants’, not 
‘trusters’ and ‘trustees’; the actions are called ‘transferring money’ rather than 
‘placing and fulfilling trust’. The typical subject is a student who has agreed to 
participate at least partly in order to make money. (In fact, in the trust game, 
CEOs are more trustworthy than students; Fehr and List 2004.) The action of 
sending money is open to multiple interpretations: it could be seen as placing 
a trust, but it could also be seen as a gamble undertaken in the hope of mak-
ing more money. Even if it is seen as placing a trust, the receiver may think 
that the interaction is not properly framed as a trust situation, that placing 
13 Scored according to the Hare Psychopathy Checklist–Revised (PCL–R), a psychopath is some-
one who scores more than 30 out of a possible 40. The mean score in the general population is 2–4 
out of 40, with more than half the population scoring zero or one and females scoring lower than 
males (Neumann and Hare 2008). Note that the PCL–R is not a psychiatric diagnosis—although 
we might expect that people who have high levels of psychopathy will also be diagnosed with 
‘antisocial personality disorder’.
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trust is not appropriate in the laboratory, and therefore not be motivated to 
respond in a trustworthy manner. These tendencies can be exacerbated by 
motivated construal, when an ambiguous situation is interpreted in a way that 
is consonant with a person’s interests, without the person necessarily even 
being conscious of this.14 The more ambiguous and atypical a situation is, the 
more we can expect there to be motivated construal.
The trustworthiness of non-psychopaths can be enhanced by making it 
clear that the situation is one of strong trust, and furthermore, that it is one 
where strong trust and trustworthiness are appropriate. However, there is a 
small percentage of psychopaths, who always act according to the principle 
of self-regard and who would deliberately breach trust whenever it was to 
their advantage. These people will only ever be weakly trustworthy. Material 
incentives are needed to ensure their trustworthiness. As we might expect, 
psychopaths are over-represented in the prison population, a widely quoted 
estimate is 15–25% (Hare 1996).15
Unfortunately, whilst psychopaths may need sanctions to elicit weakly 
trustworthy behaviour, sanctions can have a negative effect on strong trust-
worthiness. There is an inherent tension between strong trust and material 
incentives: if trusters use incentives then they are not placing strong trust. 
Imagine someone taking the role of truster in a trust game who says, ‘I trust 
you to return money and I  will sanction you if you don’t.’ The sentence 
makes sense if we parse it as ‘I (weakly) trust you to return money because 
I will sanction you if you don’t.’ But it is strange to say ‘I (strongly) trust you 
to return money and I will sanction you if you don’t’, because if the person 
really (strongly) trusted the trustee, then she wouldn’t need to threaten sanc-
tions. The sanction is a signal that the relationship is not governed by strong 
trust. Sanctions substitute for strong trust.
Evidence from laboratory experiments on trust confirms this: using the 
threat of punishment in order to enforce high returns in the trust game back-
fires (Fehr and Rockenbach 2003; Fehr and List 2004). In a version of the trust 
game where trusters stated their desired back-transfer and were allowed to 
impose a fine if they received less than the desired amount, imposing a fine 
led to less money being sent back. (Note that the proceeds from the fines 
did not go to the truster, so there was no financial benefit to imposing fines 
14 An infamous example is found in Hastorf and Cantril (1954), where fans of opposing teams in 
a dirty game each saw the other side as being the perpetrators of most fouls.
15 Hare’s (1996) estimate is based on his experience of testing the US prison population. 
Obviously the figure depends on factors such as the rate of incarceration and how prisoners are 
split between gaols and mental institutions, but studies on other prison populations agree that 
the rate of psychopathy in prison is higher than in the general population, finding proportions of 
3%–49% (Sullivan and Kosson 2006). The mean score amongst US prisoners is 22–4 (Hare 1996), 
which is also substantially higher than the mean score of 2–4 in the general population (Neumann 
and Hare 2008).
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other than any effect on the amount of money sent back.) The threat of 
sanctions also led to less money being returned when the sanctions were 
imposed by the experimenter, without the knowledge of the trusters (Houser, 
Xiao, McCabe, and Smith 2008). This finding is consistent with a large lit-
erature which demonstrates that monetary rewards and punishments some-
times backfire—for instance, payments reduce work effort and the offer of 
monetary compensation reduces willingness to do civic duty—known as the 
‘motivation crowding effect’ (Frey and Jegen 2001).16
In contrast, those subjects who forewent the punishment option in favour 
of strong trust found that their trust was rewarded (Fehr and Rockenbach 
2003; Fehr and List 2004). In the trust game with the punishment option, if 
the fine was not imposed then the trustees sent more money back and trust-
ers were better off—both compared to when the fine was imposed and com-
pared to the version where there was no possibility of a fine. Not imposing 
a threat of punishment when one is on offer is a signal that the relationship 
involves strong trust.
However, the majority of subjects threatened sanctions, even though the 
threats decreased their expected earnings (Fehr and List 2004). This may be 
related to an overly pessimistic view of other people’s motivations: people 
believe that others are more motivated by extrinsic incentives than they are 
themselves (Heath 1999). In fact, the overwhelming majority of people have 
motivational structures that include both self-regarding and non-self-regarding 
elements, and most people have a large capacity for non-self-regarding behav-
iour. Whether or not they behave in a non-self-regarding and hence strongly 
trustworthy manner depends the institutional structures and the types of 
relationships they perceive they are in.
When designing institutions, there is a tension between the need to 
threaten sanctions, in order to keep psychopaths in line, and the need to 
reinforce the perception of non-psychopaths that strong trust is appropriate. 
To some extent, the conflict in approaches is unavoidable. But it is not as bad 
as it looks, or as it is sometimes made out to be.
The tension between strong trust and the need for sanctions occurs when 
there is a mixture of psychopaths and non-psychopaths. But the composition 
of organisations is not fixed. We can increase strong trust in organisations by 
making them a less attractive place for psychopathic types. It is an open ques-
tion whether there are more psychopaths in finance than in other sectors. 
Psychopathy is more prevalent amongst business leaders than in the popu-
lation as a whole, with the proportion of psychopaths rising to 4% (Babiak 
and Hare 2009; Babiak, Neumann, and Hare 2010; Board and Fritzon 2005). 
16 For more on the role of prices in shaping frames and the connection of this to the motivation 
crowding effect, see Gold (ms).
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However, to my knowledge there is no study comparing business leaders to 
leaders in other fields and it seems likely that psychopaths, being ruthless 
and manipulative, will be over-represented in leadership positions in any 
field. But it is also plausible that professions offering high financial rewards 
are particularly attractive to psychopaths, since they do not get satisfaction 
from non-self-regarding aspects of a job. In general, we can affect the type of 
people that we attract into roles by varying the currency in which rewards are 
offered (Brennan and Hamlin 2000). This is something to bear in mind when 
considering executive compensation, and other types of compensation that 
society can bestow such as honours and esteem.
Even within a sector that is composed of a cross-section of society, includ-
ing some psychopaths, the tension between strong trust and sanctions is less 
than it seems from the experiments cited above. The literature on the coun-
terproductive effect of sanctions focuses on financial penalties, abstracting 
from the social or moral sanctions which are often attached to punishment. 
For instance, in experimental trust games with sanctions, there is no men-
tion of fines or any normative language, only ‘conditional pay-off cuts’ (e.g. 
Houser, Xiao, McCabe, and Smith 2008). A pay-off cut could be seen as a price, 
not as a punishment. Even fines operate in an ambiguous space between price 
and punishment. I certainly know people who regard risking a parking ticket 
as taking a gamble and the possibility of a fine as the price of parking. In a 
well-known experiment, fining parents who were late picking up their chil-
dren up from nursery led to an increase in lateness; the parents treated the 
fine as a price that was worth paying (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000). The idea 
that a punishment is a price is embodied in the economic analysis of crime. 
In those models, when a fine is threatened the cost of the prohibited activity 
is the amount a violator can expect to pay (the level of fine weighted by prob-
ability of getting caught), and agents treat this cost like the price of engaging 
in the activity. The natural extension of this approach, as noted by the econo-
mist Tyler Cowan (2013)—possibly tongue in cheek—would be to charge VAT 
on fines, as a consumption tax on the fined activity.
If agents are completely self-regarding, then thinking about sanctions in 
wholly material terms makes sense. But non-self-regarding agents will also be 
sensitive to social sanctions, like opprobrium or disapproval, and the moral 
sanctions of their own conscience. These social and moral aspects of sanc-
tioning can be hugely important. Since punishment is usually accompanied 
by opprobrium and guilt, studying financial sanctions in isolation is distort-
ing. In the absence of accompanying social sanctions, it may be natural to 
interpret financial sanctions as a price rather than a punishment, and prices 
elicit different behaviour to punishments. The law threatens punishment for 
murder and theft, but people do not usually argue that these laws increase the 
incidence of crime. In these cases it is clear that the behaviours are wrong, that 
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there is a social consensus that they are inappropriate, and that the material 
sanctions are targeted at a small minority of deviants. Material punishments 
do not necessarily have counterproductive effects if they are embedded in 
a clear social and moral framework. If we have that framework then, in the 
same way that some have advocated using different types of rewards to moti-
vate different types of people (e.g. Brennan and Hamlin 2000), we can use 
different types of sanctions to motivate different types of people.
Of course, the reaction to the financial crisis has included moral oppro-
brium—from the general public. But general opprobrium alone may not be 
sufficient. People may have a generic dislike of criticism and censure but, in 
order to strongly motivate, opprobrium needs to come from those whose 
opinion they care about. The same point can be made about the motivat-
ing power of esteem: a complete theory will specify whose esteem is being 
pursued. Often the people whose approbation is sought are not members 
of society in general, but of a smaller group of people who are close to or 
connected with the agent. For instance, in the professional domain, people 
may seek approbation from others within their organisation or employment 
sector. These are also the people who set the norms of conduct within the 
workplace. So social sanctions that would effectively prevent untrustworthy 
behaviour in finance need to be imposed from within the sector, and strongly 
trustworthy behavour needs to be supported by the culture of organisations.
These two approaches—changing the composition of organisations and 
changing their culture—are complementary. The entry and exit of those 
who are motivated by more than self-regard can be self-reinforcing (Bruni 
and Smerilli 2009). To the extent that the people at the top of organisation 
are particularly influential in setting the tone, their behaviour and the sort 
of behaviour that they endorse can be disproportionately important. It is 
alleged that some leaders of financial institutions either deliberately breached 
the trust of their clients or tacitly endorsed the untrustworthy behaviour of 
those further down the organisation. It seems that some business leaders do 
need to be motivated by sanctions. However, even amongst business lead-
ers, the vast majority of people have a capacity for empathy and conscience. 
We shouldn’t expect that they are all looking to take advantage of trusters. 
Regulation change is part of the response to the financial crisis, but culture 
change is also a useful part of the policy toolbox.
6.7 Conclusion
When Mill introduced the ‘arbitrary definition’ that was to become the neo-
classical economic agent, his idea was that the principle of self-regard was an 
approximation, which ‘is then to be corrected by making proper allowance 
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for the effects of any impulses of a different description, which can be shown 
to interfere with the result in any particular case’ (Mill 1836). The principle 
of self-regard abstracts away from the non-self-regarding motivations that 
result in strong trustworthiness. Strong trust is ubiquitous, efficient, and has 
a priority over weak trust. If we want to encourage trustworthy behaviour in 
finance, then we should not discount non-self-regarding motivations, and we 
should design policies and institutions that encourage strong trustworthiness.
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